Background Following withdrawals, failures, and significant litigation settlements, drug product launches in the anti-obesity category slowed despite a large and growing unmet need. Litigation concerns, a more risk-averse regulatory policy, and the difficulty of developing a product with a compelling risk-benefit profile in this category may have limited innovators' expected return on investment and restricted investment in this therapeutic area. Objective The objective of the study was to estimate perceived manufacturer risk associated with product safety litigation and increased development costs vs. revenue expectations on anticipated return on investment and to determine which scenarios might change a manufacturer's investment decision. Methods Expected net present value of a weight-management drug entering pre-clinical trials was calculated for a range of scenarios representing evolving expectations of development costs, revenue, and litigation risk over the past 25 years. These three factors were based on published estimates, historical data, and analogs from other therapeutic areas. Results The main driver in expected net present value calculations is expected revenue, particularly if one assumes that litigation risk and demand are positively correlated. Changes in development costs associated with increased regulatory concern with potential safety issues for the past 25 years likely did not impact investment decisions. Conclusions Regulatory policy and litigation risk both played a role in anti-obesity drug development; however, product revenue-reflecting efficacy at acceptable levels of safety-was by far the most important factor. To date, relatively modest sales associated with recent product introductions suggest that developing a product that is sufficiently efficacious with an acceptable level of safety continues to be the primary challenge in this market.
Introduction
Following several high-profile withdrawals and failures, including at least one very large litigation settlement in the late 1990s [1] , launches of anti-obesity drugs slowed until very recently (2012) (2013) (2014) , despite the large and growing unmet need and active on-going research in this therapeutic area [2, 3] . One hypothesis is that innovators were not successful in balancing safety and efficacy sufficiently to develop a product that could generate high revenue [4] . A second is that a more risk-averse regulatory policy dissuaded product entry [3] . A third and related hypothesis, which has not been investigated systematically, is that concern about litigation may have deterred companies from investing in this area. The objective of this research was to develop a model to test these hypotheses.
In 1973, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved fenfluramine (Pondimin Ò ) for appetite suppression in the short-term management of obesity; dexfenfluramine (Redux TM ) was approved much later (in 1996) for the same indication [5] . With the objective of achieving significant weight loss in patients, some physicians began prescribing fenfluramine or dexfenfluramine together with phentermine (FDA approved in 1959), and patients began taking them for extended periods of time. However, these co-prescribed agents (known as ''fen-phen'' and ''dexfenphen'', respectively) had not received FDA approval as combination drugs [5, 6] . In 1997, cases of heart valve abnormalities were reported among patients taking the combination of fenfluramine and phentermine or dexfenfluramine and phentermine. Notably, Mayo Clinic researchers reported 24 cases of heart valve abnormalities in patients who had taken fen-phen [7] . American Home Products (Wyeth) , the manufacturer, agreed to withdraw fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine from the market. Subsequently, individual and class action lawsuits were filed, and large damages were awarded [1] .
Despite widespread recognition of the prevalence of obesity in USA and public health implications [8] , the FDA has approved few new drugs indicated for (long-term) weight management in the last 20 years. In 1997, the FDA approved sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate (Meridia Ò ) for weight loss and maintenance of weight loss in patients with a body mass index of C30 kg/m 2 or for patients with a body mass index of C27 kg/m 2 who have other cardiovascular risk factors [9] . However, Abbott Laboratories voluntarily withdrew sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate from the market in 2010, after the FDA concluded that the risks outweighed the benefits associated with the use of sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate [10] . The decision was based on the results of the Sibutramine Cardiovascular Outcomes (SCOUT) trial, in which there was a 16 % increase in the risk of major adverse cardiovascular events in the sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate treatment arm vs. placebo [11] .
Orlistat 120 mg (Xenical Ò ) was approved in 1999 as a prescription drug for the management of obesity and for reducing the risk of regaining weight after prior weight loss, in conjunction with a reduced caloric diet for weight loss; orlistat 60 mg (Alli Ò ) was approved in 2007 for overthe-counter use for weight loss in overweight adults, to be taken in conjunction with a reduced-calorie and low-fat diet [12, 13] .
In 2007, the FDA issued a draft guidance to the industry for the development of drugs and therapeutic biologics with a weight management indication, which incorporates weight loss and weight maintenance [14] . The 2007 draft guidance was designed to replace a 1996 prior version, which was based on another guidance developed to demonstrate safety in lipid-lowering drugs. The 2007 draft guidance for weight management drugs covered the duration and size of phase III trials, the patient population, and the criteria defining drug efficacy [15] . Furthermore, in 2007, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act was passed, which greatly changed the FDA's responsibilities and gave the FDA the authority to require postmarket safety studies [16] . Finally, in March 2012, the FDA Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee recommended that phase II and III clinical trials of weight management drugs should be enriched to include patients with baseline characteristics that indicate an elevated risk for major adverse cardiac events-similar to the FDA 2008 guidance for drugs for the treatment of diabetes mellitus [15, 17, 18] .
Recently, the FDA approved phentermine/topiramate extended-release (Qsymia ) extended-release tablets, and liraglutide [rDNA origin] injection (Saxenda Ò ) for weight management indications [19] [20] [21] [22] .
Phentermine/topiramate and lorcaserin hydrochloride were approved in 2012 as additions to a reduced-calorie diet and exercise for chronic weight management; naltrexone/bupropion hydrochloride and liraglutide injection were approved in 2014 with an indication for chronic weight management in addition to a reducedcalorie diet and physical activity [19] [20] [21] 23] .
The FDA required randomized, double-blind, controlled, post-marketing trials for three of the four recently approved weight management drugs and may impose a similar requirement for any new anti-obesity drugs. These studies were required to evaluate the effect of long-term treatment on the incidence of major cardiovascular events. Clinical trial enrollees were to include obese and overweight individuals with cardiovascular disease or multiple cardiovascular risk factors [24] [25] [26] . For liraglutide, the most recently approved drug, a post-market registry study of medullary thyroid carcinoma and the collection of cardiovascular outcomes on patients diagnosed with breast cancer during the LEADER (Liraglutide Effect and Action in Diabetes: Evaluation of Cardiovascular outcomes Results) trial and a second trial (Trial 1839) [23] were required for final FDA approval.
Our objective is to understand the impact of risk and the associated cost of product safety litigation and potential product withdrawal on a manufacturer's development decisions by estimating the expected net present value (ENPV) of a hypothetical weight management drug entering preclinical trials.
Methods
We used a decision analysis model to estimate the ENPV of developing new pharmaceutical products to treat obesity and manage weight under three policy scenarios-before the 2007 guidance, between the 2007 guidance and the 2012 guidance, and after the 2012 guidance. The model incorporates the risk of product safety litigation by using historical data to estimate the probability of litigation, the probability of a significant damage award, the probability of early product withdrawal, and the size of damages awarded as a result of litigation. Over time, drug development costs increased because of the added safety requirements for trials, which also lowered the probability of success. At the same time, the risk of product withdrawal and product safety litigation decreased because any new successful drug would now be safer. The decision model is similar, with the exception that the payouts and probabilities differ in each of the regulatory scenarios (see Appendix, Supplemental Figure 1 for the decision tree).
No human research subjects or patient-level data were included in the analyses; therefore, this study did not require review by an institutional review board. Data used in this study were obtained both from publicly available data sources and from proprietary databases that track public financial, regulatory, and legal filings.
Model Structure
ENPV of a compound at the beginning of pre-clinical testing was calculated over a 23-year period, incorporating the cost of drug development, revenue, and the cost of product safety litigation from pre-clinical testing through the end of patent protection at year 20. FDA approval occurs in year 12, with a manufacturer accruing revenue beginning in that year, based on an average regulatory approval time of 12.3 years (calculated from initial pre-clinical development entry) [27] (Table 1) . Given patent protection is 20 years from the start of preclinical research [28] , duration of market exclusivity was calculated as 7.7 years (20 minus 12.3 years). This is similar to the market exclusivity afforded by the HatchWaxman Act, which grants 5 years of market exclusivity to new drugs with an ''active moiety'' that has not been previously approved by the FDA. Because the FDA cannot accept or approve an abbreviated new drug application during the 5 years without new clinical data and because new drug applications typically take 2 years from approval to filing, the duration of market exclusivity often exceeds 7 years, even if patent protected market exclusivity had run out by the time of FDA approval (see [29, 30] ).
The model assumes that litigation settlements or damages are paid out in years 20-23, 7-10 years after FDA approval, which is the range observed for obesity drugs and other high-profile drug safety cases where damages were awarded or where the case concluded in a settlement that was reported publicly. For the two obesity drugs involved in litigation, dexfenfluramine-related litigation (Wyeth) [33, 34] . ENPV was defined as the expected revenue minus the expected development costs, minus the expected litigation damages, discounted by the real cost of capital. We assumed an average real cost of capital of 11 % and considered the range of 9-13 % in sensitivity analyses; this is the range of estimates for the pharmaceutical industry reported in published studies on drug development costs [27, 35, 36] , although the cost of capital may vary by development phase [37] .
Expected research and development (R&D) costs were calculated using three types of data: (1) the duration of each development phase, (2) the probability of the drug surviving each development phase (pre-clinical through phase III) to marketing approval, and (3) the cost associated with each phase of development.
Expected revenue was calculated in two steps. In the first step, the expected revenue of an approved drug was calculated as the sum of discounted revenue, adjusted for the probability of being marketed through patent expiration, which was adjusted for the probability of early product withdrawal owing to potential safety problems. In the second step, this sum was multiplied by the probability of the drug surviving to marketing approval, resulting in the expected revenue.
Expected litigation damages were also calculated in two steps. In the first step, the expected damages of an approved drug were calculated as the probability of significant damages being awarded, multiplied by the size of those damages, discounted to present value. In the second step, damages were adjusted by the probability that a drug [75] , Powel et al. [4] , Ioannides-Demos et al. [47] , and the FDA [50] . Drug manufacturer, approval date, and date withdrawn data were obtained from the FDA and drug label when available. Legal status based on a search through company's SEC 10-K filings [57] and corroborated via search of LexisNexis [58] , Law360 [59] , and Factiva [60] . Search parameters include the company, drug name, and ''product liability'' or ''damages'' b Fenfluramine began being used in combination with phentermine in the early 1990s, after the publication of studies showing greater weight loss when the two drugs were used in combination [54, 55] is approved for marketing, resulting in expected litigation damages.
Lowering the probability that the drug receives FDA approval not only lowers the expected R&D costs, but also lowers the expected revenue and the expected damage award from litigation, lowering ENPV. All monetary values in this paper were inflated to 2014 dollars using the implicit price deflator for GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis) and assuming that the inflation rate for 2013-2014 is the same as the prior year's inflation rate [38] .
Model Inputs

R&D Costs
Expected R&D costs were calculated based on: (1) the duration of each development phase, (2) the probability of the drug surviving each development phase (pre-clinical through phase III) to marketing approval, and (3) the cost associated with each phase of development (shown in Table 3 ). For all three policy scenarios, we use estimates of phase duration taken from DiMasi et al. [27] . This approach makes the simplifying assumption that phase duration did not increase significantly (more than a few years) in post-2007 policy scenarios. Phase costs for the pre-2007 policy scenario were also obtained from DiMasi et al. [27] . These estimates on R&D duration and cost have been widely cited and used in other analyses [35, 39] . Development success rate overall and by clinical phase were obtained from the most recently published data from the same research group that produced the phase duration and phase cost data [40] .
For the 2007-2012 policy scenario, we estimate that the cost of phase III trials nearly doubled, as a result of the FDA guidance that at least 4500 patients be enrolled in these trials [14] . This estimate was calculated based on the required number of patients and estimates of per patient cost [41] . Furthermore, in 2007, the FDA was granted the authority to require post-approval safety studies, which it has required for all four obesity drugs approved since 2007. We use the estimate of phase IV costs provided by DiMasi et al. [27] . We assume that the requirement for larger phase III trials reduced the probability of phase III success and the overall success rate by 10 % compared with the pre-2007 scenario. This is a relatively modest decrease, but it is likely that, while the larger trials may be more likely to detect a safety signal and lower the success probability, the FDA's imposition of post-marketing commitments on the manufacturers of weight management drugs (that include a large, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to rule out an unacceptable incidence of major adverse cardiovascular events) may provide reviewers with greater assurance in voting to recommend a weight management drug for approval [3] .
For the current policy scenario (2012-2015), we estimate that phase III costs again doubled, as a result of the 2012 guidance that requires trials for weight management drugs to be enriched with patients with cardiovascular risks. This estimate was based on evidence from diabetes development costs, which found that phase III costs doubled after a similar FDA guidance was issued for the development of diabetes drugs [42] . The 2012 guidance for weight management drugs states that this enrichment could occur in either/both phase II and phase III trials; we have assumed that this guidance has predominantly impacted phase III trials. We use the most recent estimate of phase IV costs provided by the DiMasi et al. team (unpublished [43] ), which is about 2.5 times the cost estimated in their earlier published work (DiMasi et al. [27] ). We make a conservative assumption that this requirement does not markedly reduce success probabilities.
We conducted sensitivity analyses around the probability of success using two alternative sources of data that represent that range of values on success probability in recent literature. Hay et al. [44] found that only 10 % of compounds are approved (compared with 13 % reported by DiMasi et al. [40] , which is the assumption used in the pre-2007 policy scenario). However, Adams and Brantner et al. [45] estimated success rates of about 2.5 times higher than DiMasi et al. (26 % overall success rate). DiMasi et al. [40] combined both public and private (survey) data sets for the 50 largest pharmaceutical firms (assessed based on 2006 sales) and analyzed the success rates through 2009 with phase I testing for new drugs initiated between 1993 and 2004. The other two studies rely on public data only. Hay et al. [44] examined 835 firms, including biotech companies, as well as specialty and large pharmaceutical firms (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , and Adams and Brantner [45] used data on 183 publicly traded drug companies from 1989 to 2001.
Revenue
To estimate the revenue-and litigation-related inputs for the model, we identified obesity drugs (Table 2 ) from published research, review articles, and CenterWatch [4, [46] [47] [48] [49] . The drugs were cross-referenced with the FDA's Drugs@FDA resource to ensure accuracy of the list [50] .
As a base case, we assumed that peak revenue for a weight management drug occurs in year 20, the last year prior to patent expiration, and grows linearly from market entry. For the base case, conservatively, peak revenue is estimated to be $847 million (adjusted to 2014 $US), based on orlistat peak revenue, estimated from the EvaluatePharma database [51] . With a higher regulatory threshold for weight management drug efficacy and safety, FDA Food and Drug Administration future weight management drugs may ultimately be more financially successfully. We then analyzed scenarios in which this peak revenue expectation was doubled and tripled. The doubled estimate is consistent with a recent $US1.5 billion forecast for peak sales of liraglutide for weight management [52] . As a comparison, fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine achieved peak sales of $244 million and $187 million (adjusted to 2014 $US) [51] , but they were only on the market for a limited amount of time (2 years for dexfenfluramine and 3 years for fenfluramine), while sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate achieved peak sales of $109 million (adjusted to 2014 $US) [51] and was on the market for 10 years (all sales inflated to 2014 $US). We assumed that if a drug is withdrawn, it is withdrawn 4 years after market entry-half of the patent-protected lifespan of the drug. This assumption is similar to the experience of rimonabant (Accomplia), which was approved in the EU in July 2006 and then withdrawn in October 2008; it was never approved in USA. Other withdrawals varied widely; sibutramine hydrochloride monohydrate, the most recently withdrawn drug in the US market, was withdrawn in 2010, about 13 years after FDA approval in 1997 (Table 2 ). Dexfenfluramine and fenfluramine were both withdrawn in 1997 [53] ; fenfluramine was approved in 1973 and dexfenfluramine was approved in 1996. Both agents began being used in combination with phentermine in the early 1990s, when studies emerged showing weight loss with these combinations [54, 55] . Finally, norephedrine was withdrawn in 2000, after FDA approval in 1939 [56] .
Damages or Settlements Associated with Litigation
Data on litigation and damage awards were collected from publicly available sources on product liability lawsuits using four sources: SEC 10-K filings [57] , LexisNexis [58] , Law360 [59] , and Factiva [60] . Searches were conducted for the drug manufacturers shown in Table 2 .
For the purposes of this analysis, we treated fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine as one drug, because litigation around these drugs was handled together [5] . We also excluded lorcaserin hydrochloride, phentermine/topiramate, naltrexone/bupropion hydrochloride, and liraglutide injection, because they were approved only recently and, therefore, there is insufficient time to observe any litigation or damages.
Company 10-K filings represent an important source of information about litigation, because the manufacturers of most products of interest are publicly traded US companies and, thus, are required to report significant business risks. For those manufacturers, we examined online 10-K reports [57] to identify litigation and damage awards since the early 1990s; these reports are available starting around 1994. Most 10-Ks report ''any significant business risks'' in the few years immediately preceding the report. We also used LexisNexis [1, 58] , a commercial resource that includes lawsuit summary information. LexisNexis reports on some lawsuits of privately held and generic manufacturers, but it does not have detailed firm-level information. When discrepancies between these two searches arose, we used the 10-K information because these reports are more comprehensive and include the company's own estimates on total payouts. Our litigation search did not return information on all lawsuits, but the company's 10-K report provided estimates of total damages paid. We complemented these searches with searches of Law360 [59] and Factiva [60] , two other subscription-based tools that index financial and law news articles. We limited our search to litigation after 1990, because pharmaceutical product liability lawsuits were not as common before then [61] , and our search resources are more comprehensive afterwards.
We cannot be sure that we have captured all product liability litigation; however, any censoring will bias our estimates downward, giving us a conservative litigation costs estimate.
Cases were brought against the manufacturers of five of the eight drugs (excluding the four recently approved drugs), and damages were awarded to the plaintiffs who used two of the drugs. Three drugs were withdrawn from the market (see Table 2 ). Wyeth, the maker of fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, was fined $27.3 billion (in 2014 $US) in damages [62] , while the manufacturers of phenylpropanolamine were liable for $29.5 million (in 2014 $US) [1] . Sixty-three percent of the manufacturers were sued, and 25 % overall were found liable. Tables 4 and 5 summarize litigation probabilities for each policy scenario and damage or settlement amounts per FDA-approved drug, respectively. Historical data from the anti-obesity drugs discussed above are used to estimate the probability of litigation in the pre-2007 scenario. We assume that the probability of litigation declines by 30 % in the 2007-2012 scenario, and by another 30 % in 2012-2015, because safer drugs would be reaching the market and safety signals would be detected more quickly and transparently in the required post-marketing studies. It is not publicly known how much of the damage awards in the Wyeth case were actually paid out to plaintiffs. Thus, we assume that 50 % of the damages (13,664 million, in 2014 $US) were eventually paid out (based on the contingency in Wyeth's SEC 10-K reports) and use this as our base case. As a sensitivity analysis, we examine ENVP assuming that full damages were paid out in the Wyeth case. We also examine an analog in pain relief, the settlement in the rofecoxib case, because the settlement amount was disclosed. We rescale the rofecoxib settlement We do not include the cost of legal fees in the base case, but conduct sensitivity analyses by varying legal fees from $US1 million to $US100 million (based on historical data) [63] . at risk for cardiovascular events, ENPV was lower for each expected revenue assumption because we assumed that the higher development costs are only partially offset by the lower litigation costs.
Results
We conducted four one-way sensitivity analyses that varied one assumption at a time (likelihood of FDA approval, legal fees, size of litigation damages or settlement amount, and real cost of capital) and held others constant at values assumed for the 2012-2015 scenario. Lowering the probability of success to 10 % (lowest value reported in the literature) yielded results similar to those in the main analysis. Increasing the probability of success to 26 % (the highest in recent data) resulted in a positive ENPV for all the revenue assumptions (Fig. 2) . In sensitivity analyses assuming legal fees from $US1 million to $US100 million [63] we found that, overall, legal fees increased the expected cost of litigation by less than one million and thus have a negligible impact on ENPV. We also found results were similar to those reported in the main analysis (Fig. 1) when varying the size of the litigation damages or settlement amount (Fig. 3) . ENPV was negative in the base revenue assumption but positive in double-and triple-revenue assumptions, regardless of the [75] , Powel et al. [4] , Ioannides-Demos et al. [47] , and the FDA [50] . Drug manufacturer, approval date, and date withdrawn data were obtained from the FDA and drug label when available. Legal status is based on a search through company's SEC 10-K filings [57] , LexisNexis [58] , Law360 [59] , and Factiva [60] . Search parameters include the company, drug name, and ''product liability'' or ''damages'' b The conditional probability of early withdrawal on no litigation is assumed to be zero Low-sensitivity analysis: rescaled rofecoxib settlement based on total US sales of fenfluramine and rofecoxib 427 [33] and EvaluatePharma database [51] FDA Food and Drug Administration size of the settlement or damage award, even assuming that all of the contingency funds set aside for the Wyeth settlement were eventually paid out. Results were robust to varying the real cost of capital from 9 to 13 % (Fig. 4) . In our final sensitivity analyses, we varied each of the three major components of ENPV (R&D, revenue, and litigation/settlement) at the same time, using high and low assumptions from the sensitivity analyses and revenue assumptions to illustrate which of the three is the main determinant of ENPV (Fig. 5) . All of the high expected revenue cases have positive ENPV, indicating that, given a drug with blockbuster potential, litigation costs and higher R&D costs associated with policy changes will not impact the decision to invest in a drug. However, the higher R&D costs associated with changes in FDA policy changes and potential litigation costs could make a difference for more marginal drugs with a more moderate revenue potential (e.g., base case revenue similar to revenue from orlistat). FDA guidance scenario assumes 13 % probability of success [40] , research and development costs from [27] , and a historical probability of litigation (63 %). The post-2007 FDA guidance scenarios (2007-2012 and 2012-2015) assume that the probability of success in phase III is decreased by 10 % (the overall success rate is decreased to 12 %). In the 2007-2012 scenario, the cost of phase III is assumed to nearly double due to the increased number of patients (Table 3 ). The probability of litigation is assumed to decrease by 30 % (to 44 %). In the 2012-2015 scenario, the cost of phase III I assumed to be double the cost in the 2007-2012 scenario and the phase IV cost is assumed to be 2.5 times higher than the pre-2012 cost. The probability of litigation is assumed to decrease by an additional 30 % (to 31 %). All three scenarios assume the base scenario of litigation damages or settlement amounts. ENPV expected net present value, FDA Food and Drug Administration, N/A not applicable role in facilitating the product launches observed 5-7 years later. However, the decrease in ENPV was larger after the 2012 guidance, because the further decrease in litigation risk was less able to offset the higher development costs; litigation risk had already been reduced as a result of the 2007 guidance and the FDA's authority to require postmarketing safety studies. The analysis conducted here reveals that, even with a significant risk of litigation in the weight management category, high product revenue can yield positive overall expected returns, overwhelming the negative expected cost of litigation or potentially shortened time on market.
Discussion
However, the way litigation cost is modeled in the ENPV framework may not capture all the ways in which this risk may influence decision making. Such events can have broad effects across large companies' franchises and brands. To the extent that smaller or single-product companies may operate in a less risk-averse fashion, small companies might be expected to have responded most strongly to the incentives to develop anti-obesity drugs indicated for long-term weight management, particularly following the issuance of revised FDA guidance in 2007 and 2012. Indeed, the first three recent product launches came from independent companies, although one of them, naltrexone/bupropion hydrochloride, is marketed by a large company, Takeda, after it was licensed from its developer, Orexigen. There is now further evidence of large companies beginning to return to this market with Novo Nordisk's launch of liraglutide injection.
Some of these recent approvals involve agents that have been previously marketed. Phentermine/topiramate contains phentermine, one of the two drugs in the ''fen-phen'' combination. The continued research and subsequent approval of drugs similar to those involved in the Wyeth litigation suggest that this litigation did not halt continued research into these and other similar drugs. Two other recently approved drugs (naltrexone/bupropion hydrochloride and liraglutide injection) are both based on drugs with known safety profiles that have been approved for other indications. Lorcaserin hydrochloride alone is a novel drug, a 5-HT 2c receptor agonist with serotonergic effect (of note, fenfluramine, one of the two drugs in the fen-phen combination, also acted on serotonin levels). The frequent reliance on proven drugs may be a legacy of the category's history, but it is also likely a consequence of the inherent difficulty of creating anti-obesity products with high levels of safety and efficacy. The new generation of products has not yet been broadly successful but may eventually lead to significant market expansion, particularly if developers succeed with more novel product introductions. The model sensitivities explored here suggest that, at high expected revenues, ENPV is positive even with a lower probability of success and higher litigation costs. 
Limitations
The main limitation of the current model resides in its dependence on a number of assumptions for R&D associated with anti-obesity drugs, including duration of development phases, success rate in each phase of development, and cost of drug development. Historically, these values have been derived from confidential sources or from proprietary databases that compile-and may curatepublicly available information [36] . The validity of the estimates of R&D costs (and other information) published using confidential or proprietary material has been debated, owing to the inability of external parties to reproduce study findings [36, [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] and to concerns about the scientific accuracy and reliability of information compiled in commercial data-indexing services [36, 74] . In the current study, to minimize the risk of bias, we have performed sensitivity analyses, in which both lower-and upper-bound published estimates of the costs and success of drug development have been used to estimate ENPV. However, for some assumptions, studies using proprietary or confidential material remain our only source of information because of the lack of publicly available alternatives.
Another limitation of the model is in our assumption about litigation costs; the amount a manufacturer actually pays as a result of litigation is not always publicly known. The objective of our assessment is to evaluate the impact of changes in development costs, revenue, and product safety risk; therefore, we assume that the amount paid out (settlement or paid damages) is the same in each scenario. Consequently, we conducted sensitivity analyses to assess the extent to which our conclusions vary over a range of damages or settlement costs.
Finally, we evaluated the determinants of ENPV with a model that was structured to include a single-decision node of entry, rather than one with a more complex structure encompassing multiple decisions or options. These might have included an option of developing an existing drug or sharing R&D costs, which would imply lower drug development costs in either case and reinforce our main finding that expected revenue is the main driver of development decisions. Our analysis did not consider the possibility that manufacturers might favor one attribute over another, such as proven safety vs. maximum efficacy. Drugs such as liraglutide and naltrexone/bupropion hydrochloride, recently approved for weight management, have a relatively known safety record, which may have played a role in the manufacturers' decisions to develop them. Similarly, because we generalized manufacturers' decisions, we did not account for drug developer heterogeneity in tolerance for risk or other characteristics. These issues warrant further study.
Conclusions
This study modeled the expected value of developing antiobesity drugs under varying conditions following the notable product withdrawals and litigation observed in the 1990s and early 2000s. Results suggest that litigation risk meaningfully affects expected costs, both direct (litigation costs) and indirect (early withdrawal). FDA guidance issued in 2007 and a subsequent assumed reduction in litigation risk in 2007 slightly decrease the expected value of pursuing drug development but significantly decrease the relative weight of litigation costs to development costs. However, this change, coupled with higher revenue expectations, was sufficient to yield a high positive expected value, suggesting that recent launch activity reflects an expectation of high revenue potential with reduced risk.
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